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## Elections in the Developing World (POLS490R)

Fall 2017

Location: Tarbutton Hall 120

Hours: Fridays 2:00-5:00pm

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### Description

Elections have the potential to enhance public officials' accountability and responsiveness to citizens demands. Yet, in many countries where leaders are popularly elected, objective measures of their performance, as well as the citizens' perception about the quality of government, suggest that these benefits are not being realized. In this course we study why this is the case. We focus on developing countries drawing on examples from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The course is divided into four modules. The first starts with an overview of the differences between elections in industrialized countries and developing ones. We continue with a module on the accountability-enhancing role of elections. The third deals with common forms of electoral manipulation observed in the developing world. The last module touches on the role of the international community in promoting democracy, the effects of these interventions, and the challenges faced by election monitors.

### Prerequisites

- POLS 208 Political Science Methods

The articles that we will read often involve testing causal claims and researchers use a variety of techniques to that end. Because of this, some of the articles are technical. In the first session of the semester, I will give a brief overview of the most common techniques employed in the articles. In this presentation, I will focus on the interpretation of statistical results and the justification for the use of specific techniques. This introduction would assume you have taken POLS 208. You will be expected to identify the main substantive arguments of all the assigned readings, to interpret their main results, *and* to have a basic understanding of why a particular methodology was used.

### Grading

- 30% Presentations: Starting from the second session, students will be responsible for presenting articles in class. The 20 minute presentations should address the central question of the article, methodology, findings, and conclusions. If you are having trouble understanding any

part of the article, or want to discuss other aspects of your presentation, you should go to my office hours prior to your scheduled presentation.

- 35% Participation: You must come to class prepared to talk. At the end of each presentation we will have a discussion session. In principle, I expect participation to be voluntary, but I reserve the right to call on students to ask them questions. For each session, I will assign each student a participation score that will take the value of 0, 1, or 2. A score of 0 is given to someone who did not attend or did not contribute to the class discussion. A score of 1 is given to a student whose participation reflects that he or she has a basic understanding of the theoretical arguments and methodology of the article. A score of 2 is given to someone who, in addition to having a basic understanding of the article, promoted further discussion, was able to establish connections with other readings assigned for the day, or provided informed criticism. At the end of the semester you can drop the two lowest participation scores to calculate your grade.
- 35% Final paper: Throughout the semester you will write a policy paper on a topic related to elections. In October 16, you will turn in a proposal. In that proposal you will identify the topic of interest, give a general description of the project, call attention to its importance, and briefly discuss the differences with existing work in the area. The final paper will be turned in December 8. More specific requirements for both of these assignments (proposal and final paper) will be given the first day of classes. Proper citations are expected in these papers. I must report any case of plagiarism or any other violation of the academic honesty rules to the Honor Council.

## Outline

(\*) Denotes an optional reading.

- Session 1. Introduction and Overview of Statistical Techniques (08/25/17)
  - Angrist, Joshua and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 2014. *Mastering Metrics. The Path from Cause to Effect*. Chapter 1 and 2 (Appendixes are optional).
- Session 2. Elections in Developing Democracies (09/08/17)
  - Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1996. “What Democracy Is... and Is Not,” in Larry Diamond and Marc. F. Plattner (eds.) *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
  - Collier, Paul. 2009. *War, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: Harper Collins. Introduction and Chapter 1 and 2.
  - Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. “Citizens-Politicians Linkages: An Introduction,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-36.
- Session 3. Mature Democracies and Electoral Manipulation (09/15/17)
  - Riordon, William L. *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*. Signet Classics: New York. Chapters 1-6, 9, and 18.

- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 8.
- Alvarez, Michael, Thad Hall, and Susan Hyde. 2008. *Election Fraud Detecting and Detering Electoral Manipulation*. Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press. Chapters 5, and 6
- \*Ziblatt, Daniel. 2009. “Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: Theory and Evidence from pre-1914 Germany” *American Political Science Review* 103 1-21.
- Session 4. Accountability I (9/22/17)
  - Achen, Christopher and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do not Produce Responsive Government* Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
  - Fearon, James. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types vs. Sanctioning Poor Performance” in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.) *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Session 5. Accountability II (9/29/17)
  - McMillan, John and Pablo Zoido. 2004. “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(4) 69–92.
  - Rueda, Miguel and Nelson Ruiz-Guarín. 2017. “Political Agency, Election Quality, and Corruption.” Manuscript Emory University.
- Session 6. Clientelism and Vote Buying I (10/06/17)
  - Auyero, Javier. 2000. “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account” *Latin American Research Review* 35(3) 55-81.
  - Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 3-23.
  - Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin” *World Politics*, 55 399–422.
  - \*Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4) 804–821.
- Paper proposals due (10/16/17)
- Session 7. Clientelism and Vote Buying II (10/20/17)
  - Cruz Cesi, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubin. 2017. “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines.” Forthcoming *American Economic Review*.

- Wang, Chin-Shou and Charles Kurzman. 2007. “The Logistics: How to Buy Votes,” in Frederic C. Schaffer (ed.) *Elections For Sale. The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
  - \*Finan, Frederico and Laura A. Schechter. 2012. “Vote Buying and Reciprocity” *Econometrica* 80(2) 863–881.
  - \*Rueda, Miguel R. 2014. “Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 2017, 61(1).
  - \*Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina” *American Political Science Review* 99(3) 315–325.
- Session 8. Violence and Elections (10/27/17)
    - Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos. “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence From Colombia” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(1) 5–44.
    - Hafner-Burton, Emily, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. “When do Governments Resort to electoral Violence?” *British Journal of Political Science* 44 149–179.
    - Blattman, Christopher. 2009. “From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda” *American Political Science Review* 103 (2) 231–247
    - \*Brancati, Dawn and Jack L. Snyder. 2011. “Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3) 469–492.
    - \*Fafchamps, Marcel and Pedro Vicente. 2013. “Political Violence and Social Networks: Experimental Evidence From a Nigerian Election” *Journal of Development Economics* 101 27–48.
  - Session 9. Ethnic Politics (11/03/17)
    - Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “What is Ethnicity and Does it Matter?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 397–424.
    - Dunning Thad, Janhavi Nilekani. 2013. “Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils” *American Political Science Review* 107 (1) 35–56
    - Posner, Daniel. 2004. “The Political Salience of Cultural Differences: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi” *American Political Science Review* 98 (4) 529–545.
    - \*Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. “Counting Heads: a Theory of Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    - \*Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 and 5.
  - Session 10. Electoral Effects of Manipulation (11/10/17)

- Simpser, Alberto. 2012. “Does Electoral Manipulation Discourage Voter Turnout?” *The Journal of Politics* 74(3) 782–795.
- Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. “The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.” Liberty Fund. Ch 18.
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 9. (Nicholas)
- \*Vicente, Pedro. 2014. “Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence From a Field Experiment in West Africa” *The Economic Journal* 124 (574) F356–F387
- \*Zucco, Cesar. 2013. “When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002-10” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4) 810–822.
- Session 11. Democracy Promotion and Election Monitoring I (11/17/17)
  - Hyde, Susan D. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
  - Berger, Daniel, Alejandro Corvalan, William Easterly, Shanker Satyanath. 2013. “Do Superpowers Have Short and Long Term Consequences For Democracy?”, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 41, (1) 22-34.
  - Collier, Paul. 2009. *War, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: Harper Collins. Chapters 8 and 9.
  - \*Kelley, Judith. 2012. “International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 203-222.
- Session 12. Democracy Promotion and Election Monitoring II (12/01/17)
  - Geisler, Gisela. 1993. “Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Electoral Observation and Democratic Standards.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(4) 613-637.
  - Golden, Miriam A., Joseph Asunka, Sarah Brierley, Eric Kramon, and George Oforu. 2017. “Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies.” Forthcoming *British Journal of Political Science*.
  - Kelley, Judith. 2012. *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 3, 4, and 7.

## Others

- The honor code is in effect throughout the semester. Any form of academic misconduct will be reported to the honor council. <http://catalog.college.emory.edu/academic/policies-regulations/honor-code.html>
- Emory University is committed under the Americans with Disabilities Act and its Amendments and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to providing appropriate accommodations to individuals with documented disabilities. If you have a disability-related need for reasonable

academic adjustments in this course, provide me with an accommodation notification letter from Access, Disabilities Services and Resources office. Students are expected to give two weeks-notice of the need for accommodations.